Abstract: The present article investigates the intellectual and discursive orientation of the culture-critical essay West Infection by the twentieth century Iranian writer Ǧalāl Āl-e Aḥmad . In doing so, it likewise discusses the question of why this particular text was to have so deep and lasting an effect in redirecting the sociocultural modernization debate among Iranian intellectuals from a mainly developmentalist discourse to one about the issues of authenticity and identity. While considering Āl-e Aḥmad's essay as raising a question of meaning -more specifically the question of human being's meaning in the face of dehumanization under the spell of technological 'Westernization' -, we critically examine, in the course of our study, former interpretive approaches that define Āl-e Aḥmad's text as reflecting influence on the author of existentialist philosophy. At the same time, we also address scholarly discussions of West Infection that regard it as a manifestation of nativism or leftist anti-capitalism. Rather than trying, in our turn, to pin down what Āl-e Aḥmad has to say to any given ideological or philosophical doctrine, we attempt to understand the use by Āl-e Aḥmad, in his essay, of terms such as 'authenticity', 'alienation', 'identity' and 'religion' -some of which are highly evocative of existentialism and of nativism indeed -as constitutive of a discourse that -for all the arguable influence on it of modern ideologies and philosophies -deserves to be treated as a word in its own right in the debate about Iran's sociocultural situation.
the seizure of the copies and the bankruptcy of the publisher. 10 While, in 1964, the author had sent an enlarged and final version to Europe to get it published by Iranian students there -which attempt failed -, it was the penultimate version of the essay that had already been printed clandestinely and, as Āl-e Aḥmad claims, without his initiative in Tehran and California. 11 In Ġarbzadegī, Āl-e Aḥmad denounces the official intellectual and practical culture of his day as a form of disease.
12 Actually, the author, in the very first lines of his essay, allegorically paraphrases the term ġarbzadegī itself as 'being infected by cholera', as a 'heatstroke' or as the 'destruction of wheat by June-bug'. 13 It is on account of this understanding by the author himself of the term and the phenomenon denoted by it that I have chosen, in this paper, to render the term as 'West infection', whenever referring to the phenomenon it signifies, and to remain with the Persian Ġarbzadegī, when quoting the title of the essay. More specifically, Āl-e Aḥmad deals with the sociocultural crisis that he sees as resulting from the official intellectual and practical culture of his day and that he calls West infection as a form of dehumanization. This, from the outset, established the Iranian authenticity discourse as a quest for the definition and the affirmation of the identity of 'human' against non-human concepts and forces.
14 The concept of 'human' underlying the official Iranian discourse of the time mainly derives from Enlightenment teachings championing the autonomy of the individual human subject grounded in ratio and from various types of nineteenth century positivism. 15 Positivist rationalism as well as empiricism and scientism -the latter often in the form of a crossbreed between positivism and Büchnerian biological materialism -in addition to popularized versions of biological and social Darwinism underlay the mindset of quite a number of late nineteenth and early twentieth century intellectuals, many of whom were also reform thinkers and political activists. 16 It was, in fact, not least the intellectual and practical projects of reform thinkers and activists that, from as early as the mid nineteenth century, introduced modern Western philosophy to the Iranian intellectual scene. 17 One of them, Mīrzā Fatḥ ʿAlī Āḫūndzāde (1812-1878), 18 recognizing the proponents of natural science -commonly referred to as atheist in the Islamic traditionas the sole bearers of truth, 19 presents a purely materialist doctrine which, in its application to human nature and society, branches off into Iranian nationalism coupled with anti-Arab racism. 20 Many of Āḫūndzāde's ideas were taken up and developed further by another key thinker, Mīrzā Āqā Ḫān Kermānī (1853-1896), 21 who -even more than Āḫūndzāde -paved the way for modern Western philosophy in Iran. 22 Kermānī, in the name of a world view based on evolutionism and materialism, identifies human body and mind with physical and chemical processes 23 and classifies humanity according to nineteenth century racist phrenology. 24 Religion, too, has to conform to this paradigm of rationalism: In the view of some late nineteenth and early twentieth century Iranian intellectuals, such as Kermānī, it can. 25 In the view of others, it can't. A prime example of the latter attitude is the very Āḫūndzāde, who holds that, if society is to become 'civilized', 'science' -by which he understands thinking independent of revelation -has to replace religion 26 and who considers materialism as the esoteric meaning of certainmost of them mystical -Islamic teachings.
27
The privileged or even exclusive identification of truth and reality -including those of human being -with 'science' and positivist rationality, forming, as it did, the doctrinal background of many thinkers relevant to, or indeed active in, the Iranian constitutional movement, 28 started to directly affect Iran's sociocultural development as early as the beginning of the twentieth century. Following the advent of the Pahlavī regime after the demise of the constitutional movement, many of the Western-inspired intellectual doctrines discussed above continued to play a dominant role, albeit in a changing sociocultural and political setting. As a case in point, it was very much on the basis of modernization through Westernization, a principle already advocated by constitutional and pre-constitutional thinkers and activists, that the Pahlavī rulers carried out their reform projects from above, with a focus on the appropriation of technology, science and education. 29 In fact, it was the hope of many Iranian intellectuals -some of whom, by the way, in the constitutional era had been championing individual freedom -for the implementation of their vision of positivist modernity that made them put up with, or even welcome, Pahlavī autocracy. 30 In the official discourse and practice throughout the Pahlavī era, and in the dominant intellectual debate until as late as the end of the 1950s, 31 the concept of positivism and rationalism -together with the concomitant understanding of 'human' -tended to be further reduced to an instrumental means-ends rationality, mainly in the form of industrialization, technocracy and developmentalism, 32 with many a progressive intellectual subscribing to historical determinism. 33 Religion, in this mindset, figured as the antithesis to progress, rationality, scientific thought and development.
34
It was not before the late 1950s that the theoretical validity of this discourse came under questioning among ever wider circles of Iranian intellectuals. 35 The fact that this happened at all, and that it happened at that time, may be attributable to a large degree to historical developments and events occurring in the reign of Moḥammad Reżā Pahlavī (r. 1941-1979 New though the dominance on intellectual discourse of this question was, it deserves mention that the question itself had been raised before in Iranian intellectual history. It was the Western-educated political and social scientist and writer Ḥoseyn Kāẓemzāde (1884 Kāẓemzāde ( -1962 , better known by his pen name 'Īrānšahr', 39 who, for all his acknowledgment of the contribution of Enlightenment thought to humanity, criticized Western modernity for its materialism and spiritual alienation resulting, as he saw it, from gearing the rational faculty toward the body -which, in Īrānšahr's conceptual mind-body dichotomy, is secondary in human beings -rather than toward the soul, which is primary.
40
Iranian nationalism's task, as envisaged by Īrānšahr, was to bring about a civilization and a human being that would steer clear of these aberrations.
41
Although Īrānšahr, in his later years, became aloof from the sociopolitical debate of his native country, working instead as the leader of a theosophic circle in Switzerland, 42 his discourse on nationalism and his criticism of instrumental rationality and materialism were taken up and developed along new lines by Seyyed Aḥmad Kasravī (1890 Kasravī ( -1946 .
43
The point we choose to take up in this paper is that it is the understanding of the identity of 'human' along the lines of a conceptually reduced positivism as championed by the official discourse of the Pahlavī state and, for a long time, prominent in the intellectual debate that Āl-e Aḥmad in his essay Ġarbzadegī subjects to a damning critique, with the catchword he uses to denote this process being 'West infection', which is also the title of his essay. But before we embark on our discussion, we have to do justice to the fact that Āl-e Aḥmad's text, in the scholarly and non-scholarly debate surrounding it, has been dealt with from a wide variety of interpretive angles.
One of them refers to Āl-e Aḥmad's political orientation as an Iranian leftist. And, indeed, Āl-e Aḥmad's long-time career as a political activist is marked by his membership in varying, but always leftist, political organizations. 44 Considering this background, a number of scholars have interpreted Ġarbzadegī as a manifestation of its author's professed leftism and anti-capitalism. 45 Such views may seem well founded, given that Āl-e Aḥmad's criticism of Western civilization displayed in his essay and elsewhere extends to Western capitalism. However, we should likewise bear in mind -and we shall deal with this issue later on in our discussion of Āl-e Aḥmad's essay -that Ġarbzadegī, however strong an anti-capitalist statement we may see in it, is at least as outspoken against machinism or 'mechanism'. And machinism is a phenomenon Āl-e Aḥmad explicitly does not relate exclusively to the capitalist West, but describes as a mode of being transcending all ideological affiliations:
We no longer live in a time in which people in the 'West' are scared of 'communism' or, in the 'East', of the bourgeoisie and of liberalism. Nowadays, even […] Khrushchev can buy wheat from America. In our times, all those isms and ideologies are avenues leading to the heavenly throne of 'mechanism' 46 and 'machinism'.
47,48
And, anyway, Āl-e Aḥmad's anti-machinism emphasized in his essay could not be put down to his leftist convictions alone. For mechanization and industrialization are no strangers to leftist ideologies and policies, whereas Āl-e Aḥmad is known to have broken away from several leftist organizations -most notably the Tūde-party -on the grounds that -besides their uncritical devotion to the Soviet Union -in their development programs aiming at industrializing Iran they failed to respect Iranian culture. 49 Moreover, the writing of Ġarbzadegī itself came at a time when Āl-e Aḥmad, disillusioned with party politics anyway, from bitter experience as a political activist had come to realize that leftist -and other secular -ideologies failed to reach the very masses whose cause they claimed to defend. 50 Āl-e Aḥmad's anti-capitalist statements in Ġarbzadegī, then, cannot be accounted for by his leftist convictions, certainly not in an exclusive manner. Another angle from which Āl-e Aḥmad's essay is frequently approached is nativism, a term introduced for the first time into scholarship, in 1943, by the sociologist Ralph Linton and defined as 'any conscious, organized 44 Boroujerdi 1996: 66; Dabashi 2008: 46-50; Lenze 2008: 20-26; Mirsepassi 2000: 101; Vahdat 2002 : 113. 45 Dabashi 2008 Nabavi: 35; Seidel 2014 attempts to revive or perpetuate is Iran's pre-industrial past. We shall get back to this point later in the paper. Now, approaching, as we do, Āl-e Aḥmad's essay as a critique of a reduced concept of 'human' as a result of a likewise conceptually reduced positivism, we may note that Āl-e Aḥmad takes issue with this process on two interconnected counts: first, that the understanding of 'human' in the process of West infection is reductionist; second, that that to which 'human' is reduced in this process is a non-human principle. The catchword Āl-e Aḥmad uses for this non-human principle is 'machine', 63 as in the following quote where he says about the situation of Iran as a country of the developing world:
The very fact alone [that we in the developing world are not producers, but mere consumers of the machine] leaves us no choice but to fashion ourselves after the design of the machine […], ourselves and our governments and our culture and our daily life.
64
In another quote where he condemns militarism as yet another form of machinism, Āl-e Aḥmad relates his concept of 'machine' to the doctrines that he regards as its intellectual background:
[…] militarism […] basically learns its ways from the machine, from the machine that in turn is the product of 'pragmatism', 'scientism' and 'positivism' and other isms of this kind. Following up the issue of a potential philosophical grounding of Āl-e Aḥmad's above-quoted dismissive remarks about pragmatism, scientism and positivism, we may take note that Āl-e Aḥmad's reading background and his translation projects do suggest a marked, but not exclusive, interest in some major themes of existentialism, notably the problem of human subjectivity.
Āl-e

73
And adherence to existentialism would certainly establish a strong counter position to positivism and rationalism. Indeed, many recipients of Āl-e Aḥmad, be they scholars or not, interpret his essay in the light of existentialist philosophy. 74 The impression of existentialist influence on the author seems to be all the more justified when we learn that Āl-e Aḥmad, besides reading and translating works by Sartre and Camus, was acquainted with the philosophy teacher Aḥmad Fardīd (1912 Fardīd ( -1994 , 75 who was a member of the aforementioned (1889-1976) thought in turn goes back to his acquaintance with the French philosopher and Orientalist Henry Corbin (1903 Corbin ( -1978 Boroujerdi 1996: 65-76; Dabashi 2008: 76; Gheissari 1998: 89, 179 n. 101; Lenze 2008: 38-39; Mirsepassi 2000: 97-114; Mirsepassi 2011: 119-124; Nabavi 2003: 57-64; Seidel 2014: 60-61; Vahdat 2000: 61; Vahdat 2002 : 113-117, 186-191. 82 ʿAbdolkarīmī 2014 Gheissari 1998: 89; Hāšemī 2015: 104-108, 148-151; Mirsepassi 2011: 119-124; Vahdat 2002 : 114-115. 83 ʿAbdolkarīmī 2014 Hāšemī 2015 : 104-108. 84 ʿAbdolkarīmī 2014 Hāšemī 2015 : 75-76, 82-87. 85 ʿAbdolkarīmī 2014 Hāšemī 2015 : 76-82, 87-89, 94-96. 86 Hāšemī 2015 . Another point besides the aforesaid Āl-e Aḥmad-Fardīd connection that has come to be interpreted as an indication of existentialist influence on Āl-e Aḥmad is the author's remark in the introduction to his essay that one of the earliest readers of it, the philosopher and translator of works of Western philosophy Maḥmūd Hūman , 91 identified its message with that of the German Ernst Jünger's (1895 Jünger's ( -1998 On the other hand, specifically with regard to the essay Ġarbzadegī with its emphasis on the machine, it would be tempting indeed to suggest an affinity to Heidegger on the part of Āl-e Aḥmad given that Heidegger had focused on the question of technology in texts that had appeared in the years before the publication of Ġarbzadegī.
99 But then, again, it is in the context of a lengthy passage on the nature of the machine in Āl-e Aḥmad's essay that we come across the remark Heidegger: 1954 Heidegger: , 1960 Heidegger: , 1977 Heidegger: (1935 Heidegger: /36), 1997 Heidegger: (1938 Heidegger: /39), 2000 Heidegger: (1959 Heidegger: ), 2007 Heidegger: (1962 ; Boroujerdi 1996: 68, 70; Manūčehrī/ʿAbbāsī 2011: 302-303 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, in the concluding chapter of his essay, Āl-e Aḥmad, in order to sum up its overall message, refers to literary works by Jean-Paul Sartre (1905 -1980 and Albert Camus , two central figures of French existentialism, as well as to Eugène Ionesco (1909 -1994 ) and Ingmar Bergman (1918 , 108 both of whom likewise prominently address the question of the meaning of human existence. The work by Camus that Āl-e Aḥmad singles out for discussion is The Plague which, as he remarks, he embarked on translating in order to better grasp its message. 109 He specifically deals with the way the plague affects the behavior of the characters in the story, rounding off his observations in the remark that
[…] the impact of the plague does not move anyone from the course he has been following so far, but, quite on the contrary, makes him move on it ever faster.
110
As his subsequent remark goes to show, this is the same kind of self-destructive obsession under the spell of disease that he attributes to Iranians befallen by West infection -likewise a contagious disease, and a disease, by the way, which Āl-e Aḥmad, in the opening lines of his essay, compares to cholera:
The same applies to us who are involved in the plague of West infection with the pulse of our decay throbbing faster and faster. again making the point that, for humans, staying human is no mode of being compatible with the machine. Āl-e Aḥmad reiterates this point when, again referring to Ionesco's play, he says:
[…] if mankind does not want to be crushed under the foot of the machine, it clearly has no choice but to transform into a rhinoceros.
115
It is a similar conclusion Āl-e Aḥmad draws from his discussion of Bergman's movie The Seventh Seal, when, obviously having in mind the major theme of the film, the silence of God, he remarks:
Once the age of belief has come to an end, the era of empiricism 116 begins. Presented with the term 'authenticity' in the above context, when assessing the possible influence on Āl-e Aḥmad of existentialism we cannot refrain from taking note that it is a key word of existentialist philosophy, notably in that, in his view, assimilate the reflexive, non-observational structure of our selfunderstanding to the kind of presence a thing -including human being as a 'thinking thing', as defined by Descartes -has when we encounter it in an attitude of observation. 127 Applying this latter, observational point of view to our self-understanding is for Heidegger 'inauthentic'. In addition to this authenticinauthentic dichotomy, however, Heidegger, in his analytic of Dasein, makes room for yet another mode of self-understanding, which takes place in Dasein's average everydayness. In it, Dasein in its self-understanding is neither consistently adhering to the non-observational, first-person point of view nor to an observational third-person point of view, but -typically in accordance with the situational requirements in its everyday world -switching between first, second and third-person points of view in a rather undifferentiated manner. Heidegger calls this mode of self-understanding the modal indifference of 'the one'.
128
Now, notwithstanding Heidegger's insistence on the contrary, one cannot get rid of the feeling that, in certain contexts, he, on the one hand, uses 'authentic' and 'inauthentic' in an evaluative sense in which 'authentic' describes a mode of existence more choice-worthy than 'inauthentic' 129 and, on the other, assimilates modally indifferent average everydayness to inauthenticity. 130 If, then, we are at all allowed to relate the term 'authenticity' and Āl-e Aḥmad's depiction, in the above quote, of West infected man as a representation of 'anyone' to such existentialist understandings of human being, we certainly have to take the inauthenticity referred to in it in the evaluative sense and, likewise, to assimilate West infected man's existence as a representation of 'anyone' in the sense of the existentialist modal indifference of 'the one' to inauthenticity in the evaluative understanding. In the mode of 'the one', according to Heidegger, ' Heidegger's notion of inauthenticity, however evaluative it may be, imply assimilating human being to a 'thing', as Āl-e Aḥmad does. To counter the objection by simply declaring Āl-e Aḥmad's description of West infected man as having no personality and his assimilation of him to a thing as hyperbolic renderings of West infected man's inauthenticity in the existentialist sense would be a cheap argument and end up in a moot point. At a less speculative level, it looks safer to regard Āl-e Aḥmad's remark about West infected man having no personality as meaning the same as his assimilating him to a thing, for the obvious reason that a thing, being not a person, naturally has no personality. This interpretation would bring us close to our conclusion drawn from the earlier quote about man transforming into a rhinoceros to the effect that, in a West infected culture, being human is no option for human being. That said, although we need notor even must not -sense existentialist deep structure underlying Āl-e Aḥmad's use of 'authenticity' here, in consideration of another quote from Ġarbzadegī that we shall discuss shortly we should likewise beware of rashly dismissing Āl-e Aḥmad's bringing up this term as simply one more example for the inflationary occurrence of 'authenticity' in colloquial speech. As already mentioned, that 'thing without authenticity' to which, according to Āl-e Aḥmad, humans are reduced under the impact of West infection is the machine:
[…] enforcing conformism on people is itself but one more necessary result of the machine, its cause and effect at the same time. Uniformity in the face of the machine, conformism in the factory, punctuality and doing the same kind of tedious job for a lifetime become a second habit for all men who deal with the machine.
132
It is this reduction of humans to the non-human principle of the machine as a thing without authenticity that in turn spells meaninglessness. And meaninglessness in Āl-e Aḥmad's essay is not merely to be understood as relative meaninglessness in the mere sense of the powerlessness of man in the face of the machine and the technological age. It is rather to be understood as a meaninglessness of the human being in absolute terms in the sense of meaninglessness itself becoming human being's very mode of being. Āl-e Aḥmad, even invoking Charlie Chaplin's Modern Times in the course of his argument, 133 takes the point of this quote still further by linking -as he does in an earlier quote -machinism to militarism in the sense that military service in a machine infected culture implies the same conformism of man as his service of the machine.
134
It is in the same vein as the previous quote that Āl-e Aḥmad, commenting on the latest developments in space travel, makes the point that they are […] the ultimate encroachment of the machine upon the sphere of humanness. 135 and […] in this heavenly journey [of space travel], dogs and monkeys are superior to this reduced mankind.
[…] by expending such human sacrifices, the machine is producing humans of a new kind, as obedient as farm animals, which means that it strips humanity of all dignity.
136
This understanding of meaninglessness as resulting from reducing man to some non-human essence, in this instance the machine, may be taken as reminiscent of the position of existentialist philosophy which deals with the world through the paradigm of meaning and understanding vis-à-vis ontologies promoting an object cognition paradigm like positivism and scientism, which Āl-e Aḥmad condemns in an earlier quote. 137 In this context, the production of humans of a new kind -'new'
in the sense of being reduced to a non-human essence like the machine -would only constitute one more example of the reduction of humans to a positivistically defined essence. Whereas in doctrines like positivism and scientism -and even more so in positivist means-ends rationality -such essentialization of the human is valued as grasping and realizing the reality of the human, in the understanding paradigm of existentialism such essentialization is considered the manifestation of an inauthentic mode of perception forever failing to get to the reality of the human and, therefore, making the human into something unreal. The essentialization of the human under the impact of West infection, then, since it dehumanizes humans, does not signify empowerment of an autonomous human subject, but rather its reduction to something non-human and, therefore, less-than-human in the sense of a mere object of some nonhuman power. 142 In this context, it deserves attention that existentialist doctrines, which advocate an understanding and meaning paradigm rather than an object cognition paradigm, come to play an important role in the Iranian authenticity debate. 143 This may be because philosophies championing the meaning question look better suited to deal with issues of authenticity and identity since both issues are intimately connected with the meaning issue. Interestingly, in his essay, Āl-e Aḥmad describes West infection as an historical process affecting both East and West. When he mentions the phenomena that he subsumes under the catchwords 'West infection' or 'machine' respectively, he often refers not only to Iran, but to the West as well. 144 The following quotes bear witness to this:
[…] parties in a democratic Western society are platforms for the gratification of the whims of unbalanced and psychopathic human beings who, being brought in line at the machine on a daily basis and forced to get up on time and to arrive at work on time and to catch the tramway, have lost every chance to display individual will in any way. Boroujerdi 1996: 63-65, 69-71; Hāšemī 2015: 11-18; Mirsepassi 2011: 28-43, 85-128; Vahdat 2002: 114-117 . 144 cf. also Mirsepassi 2011 : 120-121. 145 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964 […] as long as we [Iranians] are only consumers, as long as we do not produce the machine, we are West infected. And what is even more beautiful is that once we do produce the machine, we will be machine infected exactly like the West, whose lament about the unruliness of 'technology' and the machine is for everyone to hear.
146
Intriguingly, at this very point of his argument, Āl-e Aḥmad, in a footnote consisting of no more than a source citation, refers the reader to the essay La France contre les robots by Georges Bernanos, French writer and one of the main representatives of the so called catholic renewal -to a text, that is, which contains a scathing indictment of industrialization and machinism as transfiguring the very thinking of humans and threatening French civilization. The fact alone that Āl-e Aḥmad refers to Bernanos' text allows us to assume as much that, before completing Ġarbzadegī, he knew about the issues discussed in it. This makes us wonder all the more why he does not become more specific about what actual parallels he sees between Bernanos' essay and his own, precisely considering that even the above outline of Bernanos' message is suggestive of striking similarities to Āl-e Aḥmad's. Anticipating a point to be discussed later in this paper, we may add as a further similarity both Bernanos' and Āl-e Aḥmad's critical attitude toward the religious establishment -catholic and Muslim respectively -of their day on the one hand, while, on the other, advocating non-establishment religiosity as a remedy against machinism and West infection. Anyway, while, whatever parallels readers may feel justified to draw between Āl-e Aḥmad's Ġarbzadegī and Ernst Jünger's Crossing the Line, these cannot be accounted for by any influence on Āl-e Aḥmad of Jünger -for reasons we have discussed earlier -, Bernanos' La France contre les robots does qualify for being at least considered as a source of inspiration for Āl-e Aḥmad's essay. It is the very lament formulated in the preceding quote that, as Āl-e Aḥmad sees it, is voiced by all those Western authors he refers to in the final chapter of his essay:
And I see that the ending of all these stories amounts to the threat of the final hour that, by the hand of the demon of the machine (if we do not control it and put its spirit back into the bottle), the hydrogene bomb has been planted at the end of the road of mankind.
that it is a mere consumer of machines whereas the West is a producer.
148
Actually, what, in the final analysis, defines 'the East' in Āl-e Aḥmad's terminology and sets it apart from 'the West' is not geography, but being affected by that compounded predicament in the aforementioned sense.
149
If we take Āl-e Aḥmad's latest quotes as his last word on the future in a machine infected world, the outlook would be bleak indeed. But, according to Āl-e Aḥmad, there is hope for humans to preserve or regain their identity as humans even in the face of the machine. The author makes it clear, however, that this can, and need, not be achieved by abolishing the machine:
This is not about denying the machine as a fact or about abolishing it such as was the idea of the utopians at the beginning of the 19th century. By no means. The fact that the machine rules the world constitutes an historical necessity. It is about how to deal with the machine and technology. 150 And, anyway, Āl-e Aḥmad leaves it no doubt that he is far from glorifying Iran's pre-industrial way of life as some sort of good old times worth hankering after, but instead holds that, if only the machine was introduced according to a carefully thought up program, it could be beneficial […] so that all these eyes and hands and chests of the young villagers no longer be ruined at the carpet weaving loom in order to embellish the homes of the fine lords and ladies. what Āl-e Aḥmad condemns as West infection, is not the machine as such, but an inverted -or, in fact, perverted -relationship between the machine and human being, a relationship in which human being, instead of appropriating the machine, becomes itself -down to it very essence -appropriated by the machine. Āl-e Aḥmad, it is true, is not consistent in his terminology, using, as he does, the word 'machine', at times, in the sense of 'technical device' and, at others, as synonymous with 'machinism' or, indeed, with 'West infection'. Understood as a technical device, 'machine', according to Āl-e Aḥmad, is a means at the service of human being; conceived of as 'machinism' or 'West infection', it is an inauthentic mode of existence for human being. This is another point where we may be allowed to discern a difference between Heidegger and Āl-e Aḥmad in their approach to technology: For Heidegger, there can be no question of understanding technology or the machine, for that matter, other than in terms of an inauthentic mode of being for humans resulting from a likewise inauthentic understanding of Being under the spell of metaphysics. To conceive of 'machine' as a means, even if this understanding runs parallel to a concept of the machine in terms of an inauthentic mode of being, as is the case in Āl-e Aḥmad, as far as Heidegger is concerned would amount to blatantly ignoring the essence of technology as not being anything technological at all. 159 Rather, for Heidegger, technology is the truth of a particular epoch, i. e. of our time. 160 For Āl-e Aḥmad, however, technology or 'the machine' in the sense of West infection are the situational reality of our time, but not the truth of our time -in fact, not a truth at all, but rather the distortion of the truth: The 'truth', for him, is the fact that, as he says, the machine is a means at the service of human beings, and this 'true' relationship between machine and human being, as he sees it, has been upset or turned upside down by human being having become subservient to the machine. Both Heidegger and Āl-e Aḥmad, however, in order to revise human being's relationship to technology, are far from advocating the negation or abolishment of technology or the machine. Heidegger hopes for a shift in epochal truth itself, truth not in the formal sense of truth conditions, but in the substantive sense of what is eminently and decisively true of a particular time. 161 Āl-e Aḥmad hopes for the rise, within our epoch, of not (yet) -or less -West infected human beings to change reality by restoring the 'true' relationship between human being and the machine.
162
Now, this 'true' relationship, as the author of Ġarbzadegī has said in one of the previous quotes, consists in the machine being a means for a goal, not a goal in itself, and, in the continuation of that same quote, Āl-e Aḥmad also states what goal it is that this means should serve:
The goal is to remove poverty and to make material and spiritual welfare accessible to all people. 163 This is definitely a human goal. But precisely because it is a human goal, it only makes sense if we first define human identity and preserve humanness.
Regarding this point, Āl-e Aḥmad has clear ideas of what, at least as far as Iranian culture is concerned, constitutes human identity: It is Shii religion. 164 It is in this spirit that the author of Ġarbzadegī bemoans the execu- Āl-e Aḥmad's tribute to religion as reflected in the three previous quotes has caused much confusion among many of his recipients given that the author, in the very same essay in which he highlights the importance of Shii religion as the hallmark of Iranian cultural identity, makes some very unflattering remarks about the religious establishment of his day such as when he says:
[…] religion with all its institutions and conventions is grounding itself, as far as it can, in superstition and sheltering in bygone times and in rotten and obsolete ways, resigning itself to being a cemetery caretaker and thinking, in the 20th century, by the standards of the Middle Ages. […] and if indeed they put their best foot forward, they declared radio and television a sin, regardless of the fact that these have spread so far and wide that no hero can check them anyway. rulers to the people by using their own media and apply the rule on general questions to specific ones, and if they could give momentum to their cause by joining international clerical institutions, they would never focus so much as they are doing now on trivial issues that only result in mere ignorance of, and in isolation from, the depth of life. 180 And as far as the clergy is concerned, it can be said that the seed of Āl-e Aḥmad's admonition fell on fertile ground.
181 Even prior to, and independent of, the publication of Ġarbzadegī, parts of Iran's religious establishment had come around to recognizing the need to assume opinion leadership in dealing with 'the West' both at the theoretical and practical level and to play an active part in Iran's sociocultural development. 182 It is in the wake of these efforts that two eminent religious scholars of their time, Moḥammad Ḥoseyn Ṭabāṭabāʾī 183 and Mortażā Moṭahharī (1920 Moṭahharī ( -1979 191 There are scholars of twentieth century Iranian intellectual history who see in Āl-e Aḥmad's identification of Iranian cultural identity with religion a reflection of his biography, noting a 'return' to religion of the author in the final stage of his life. 192 And it is true that Āl-e Aḥmad had been born to a religious family and that his father, a cleric, had sent him to the holy city of Naǧaf in Iraq, a center of Shii religious learning. 193 Āl-e Aḥmad, however, after staying in Naǧaf for no longer than a few months, returned to Iran in order to pursue -without his father's knowledge -a secular education, 194 and his ideological orientation until the 1960s is marked by secular, for many years even communist, tendencies. 195 His heightened emphasis on religionbesides what he has to say about the subject in Ġarbzadegī -is manifest in his literary production in the 1960s, most notably Lost in the Crowd from 1965, his edited notes on his pilgrimage to Mecca in 1964. 196 From what becomes apparent from the essay Ġarbzadegī, however, the religion Āl-e Aḥmad turns to in the 1960s is not to be conceived in terms of convention or tradition -let alone institutionalized tradition -into which man is born, but rather as the result and the manifestation of an existential choice in the name of the question concerning the possibility for human being of being human. 'Religion' in the sense in which Āl-e Aḥmad understands it in his essay, then, is not 'religion' in the sense his father presumably understood it and wanted his son to understand it. Neither does Āl-e Aḥmad -as many reformist thinkers had done -perceive religion as a discourse that, at best, had to conform to modernist rationalist discourse and, if judged unfit to do so, had to be dropped, but values it as a discourse and as a mode of existence in their own right. Viewed from this angle, Āl-e Aḥmad's intellectual development in the 1960s cannot be rightfully called a 'return' to religion -no more than his remarks, in Ġarbzadegī, about Iran's cultural tradition can be understood as advocating a 'return' to Iran's pre-industrial past. It is the understanding of religion as an existential choice, in the way it is detectable in Āl-e Aḥmad's essay, that came to be adopted by a number of Iranian intellectuals -perhaps most conspicuously the sociologist and ideologue ʿAlī Šarīʿatī (1933-1977) 197 -, many of whom are considered as having paved the way for the 1979 revolution or even took part in it. That the understanding of religion apparent in Ġarbzadegī contributed to shaping the course and the discourse of a revolutionary movement aiming at overthrowing a regime that was itself widely perceived as an agent of West infection, against this background, comes as no surprise: For it is the understanding of religion as an existential choice that had the potential to transform religion from a 'tradition' expected to be overcome by 'Western' modernity into a force expected to overcome, in its turn, Western modernity.
Conclusion
Āl-e Aḥmad's Ġarbzadegī can be argued with good reason to constitute the single most important contribution to shifting the paradigm of the sociocultural discourse of Iranian intellectuals from being -until the late 1950s -a mainly developmentalist discourse to focusing on identity and authenticity, two issues which have remained dominant themes ever since. Speaking of authenticity, we consider it safe to say that Āl-e Aḥmad, in bringing up this concept, drew inspiration from existentialism. At the same time, we do not feel compelled to regard him as a systematic follower of existentialist philosophy in order to be able to meaningfully interpret his essay or to account for its deep and lasting impact. After all, Āl-e Aḥmad himself, although reportedly interested in Sartre and acquainted with Aḥmad Fardīd, never claimed to be a philosopher in his discourse. But it may well be this very non-commitment of the author to any particular philosophical doctrine which contributed to his essay's lasting effect. For by bringing up the issue of authenticity, while not appropriating it himself in the light of any given philosophy, Apart from these philosophers, we may again name ʿAlī Šarīʿatī, who, appropriating Sartrean existentialism and Marxism, in the name of a 'return to self' took the step from defining Iranian identity as Shii Islam, as Āl-e Aḥmad had done, to defining Shii Islam as a revolutionary doctrine and practice expected to defend Iranian identity against Western imperialism.
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But Āl-e Aḥmad's significance for these and other intellectuals does not lie in whatever influence on his Ġarbzadegī of existentialism with its stress on authenticity and the question of meaning interpreters may feel justified to attribute to this text. It may rather be seen in that Āl-e Aḥmad in his essay challenges the developmentalist ideals so fervently promoted by Iranian policy makers and intellectuals under the spell of their belief in technological rationality's promise of salvation by throwing into their face a seemingly simple question: 'So, what's the point?' Āl-e Aḥmad, in his essay, rhetorically asks this question when describing his reaction to media reports praising the latest achievements in space technology that, as Āl-e Aḥmad phrases it, have not only made it possible for man to travel to outer space, but also to reproduce there. Instead of being duly impressed, Āl-e Aḥmad comments on this news with the words:
This question of Āl-e Aḥmad's is clearly a question about meaning. But in order to make sense of it, we need not feel compelled to understand it as a question about meaning in terms of existentialism. Rather, we may be allowed to take Āl-e Aḥmad's argument implied in his question further by interpreting it as an antithesis to the belief in technological modernity being the answer to Iran's sociocultural situation. For, being appropriated by technological modernization and reduced to a mere object of the machine, human being does not matter, being deprived, as it is, of its identity as a human being and, hence, of any option of being human. But for a human being that does not matter since it does not exist anymore as a human being, technological modernization, which, after all, claims to be for the good of man, naturally cannot matter either. So, indeed -what's the point?
